j is a type L. Remember that we make the monotonicity assumption about 1h(.) with regard to its off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs and that we only report the case where the responder indexed with a lower subscript is chosen as the coalition partner ex post whenever a proposer is indifferent over which of her two responders to be included in the coalition. 
Proof of Proposition 1
Put in words: after the rejection, each player has a 1/3 chance of becoming the proposer in the second session; once a player becomes the proposer, she adopts the 1h
proposal with a symmetric tie-breaking.
(A1) implies:
The best of 2 l (H), 1 l (H) and 1h(H) are, respectively With the common knowledge that both a type H and L are equally likely a priori, player 1 faces four possible types of responders in combination (i.e. HH, HL, LH and LL) with equal probability. Thus, the probability of failing to receive a majority support is 1/4 if the 2 l (H) proposals are chosen, 1/2 if the 1 l (H) proposals are chosen, and zero if the 1h(H) proposals are chosen. Since player 1 is a type H, her continuation value equals 3 / 1 1 = v if a proposal fails to receive a majority support so that delay occurs.
It is clear from (A2) that, regardless of the value of δ , the best of 1h(H) strictly dominates the best of 1 l (H). As a result, we only need to make a comparison between 1h(H) and 2 l (H). It can be calculated that the best of 2 l (H) will be chosen 
Since player 1 is a type L, her continuation value equals
proposal fails to receive a majority support so that delay occurs.
Regardless of the value of δ , the best of 1h(L) strictly dominates the best of 1 l (L). As a result, we only need to make a comparison between 1h(H) and 2 l (H).
It can be calculated that the best of 2 l (L) will be chosen over the best of 1h ( Step 1. "No-envy" case We examine three regimes stated in Proposition 1 in turn.
The IC constraints for this regime require that a type H who chooses the best of 1h(H) have no incentives to masquerade as a type L who chooses the best of 1h(L),
and that a type L who chooses the best of 1h(L) have no incentives to masquerade as a type H who chooses the best of 1h(H), viz 3 / 2
It can be checked that the IC constraint (A7- . The "first-best" solution, the best of 1h(H) and 1h(L), cannot be supported as a separating equilibrium in this regime.
The IC constraints for this regime require that a type H who chooses the best of 2 l (H) have no incentives to masquerade as a type L who chooses the best of 2 l (L),
and that a type L who chooses the best of 2 l (L) have no incentives to masquerade as a type H who chooses the best of 2 l (H), viz 1 3 2
where V 1 =4/9, and 1 v , 2 v and 3 v follow (A4) since a rejection of 2 l (L) implies
to receive a majority support in the first session, it will give rise to the posterior belief
and hence players 2 and 3 will make the offer 1 l to player 1 if either of them becomes the proposer in the second session (Lemma 1-2). However, sequential rationality dictates that player 1 of a type H, who mimics a type L by choosing the best of 2 l (L) in the first session, reject the 1 l offer in the second session. The rejection moves the game to the third session, which ensures the payoff 1/3 for player 1 of a type H (her continuation value). This leads to V 1 =1/3·(2/3)+2/3·(1/3)=4/9 in (A7-2-1).
It can be checked that both (A7-2-1) and (A7-2-2) are violated so that both types have an incentives to masquerade as the other type. The "first-best" solution, the best of 2 l (H) and 2 l (L), cannot be supported as a separating equilibrium in this regime.
The IC constraints for this regime require that a type H who chooses the best of 2 l (H) have no incentives to masquerade as a type L who chooses the best of 1h(L),
and that a type L who chooses the best of 1h(L) have no incentives to masquerade as a type H who chooses the best of 2 l (H), viz
, which satisfies the equality part of (A7-3-2). Then it can be checked that both IC constraints (A7-3-1)-(A7-3-2) are satisfied if consists of the best of 2 l (H) and 1h(L). For all other values of δ , some IC constraints are violated, so there exists "envy" between types under "first-best" solutions.
Step 2. "Envy" case When some IC constraints are violated so that there exists "envy" between types under "first-best" solutions, we seek "second-best" solutions. "Second-best" separating equilibria exist if a type can deviate from her "first-best" solution and find profitable solutions to separate from the type who wants to mimic her. We examine respectively four regimes under which "no-envy" separating equilibria fail to exist in
Step 1.
In this regime a type H has an incentive to masquerade as a type L under the "first-best" solution. Let us fix the "first-best" proposal of a type H (i.e. the best of 1h(H)), which yields the payoff that a type H can at least guarantee herself in any separating equilibrium. We check if a type L can find profitable "second-best" solutions to separate herself from a type H. There are three possibilities:
(i) A type L seeks "second-best" solutions in the set of 1h(L) with
such that it is not profitable for a type H to mimic, viz
but profitable for a type L to separate, viz
However, there exist no such "second-best" solutions that satisfy both inequalities above in this regime.
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(ii) A type L seeks "second-best" solutions in the set of 1 l (L) with
where V 1 =4/9, and 1 v follows (A4-1) since a rejection of 1 l (L) implies
. However, there exist no such "second-best" solutions that satisfy both inequalities above in this regime.
(iii) A type L seeks "second-best" solutions in the set of 2 l (L) with
where V 1 =4/9, and 1 v follows (A4-1) since a rejection of 2 l (L) implies
In this regime a type L has an incentive to masquerade as a type H under the "first-best" solution. Let us fix the "first-best" proposal of a type L (i.e. the best of 1h(L)), which yields the payoff that a type L can at least guarantee herself in any separating equilibrium. We check if a type H can find profitable "second-best"
solutions to separate herself from a type L. There are three possibilities: (i) A type H seeks "second-best" solutions in the set of 1h(H) with 
(ii) A type H seeks "second-best" solutions in the set of 1 l (H) with
such that it is not profitable for a type L to mimic, viz
but profitable for a type H to separate, viz
there exist no such "second-best" solutions that satisfy both inequalities above in this regime.
(iii) A type H seeks "second-best" solutions in the set of 2 l (H) with
where 1 v follows (A1) since a rejection of 2 l (H) implies
In this regime both types have an incentive to masquerade as the other type under the "first-best" solution. Let us fix the "first-best" proposal of a type L (i.e. the best of 2 l (L)), which yields the payoff that a type L can at least guarantee herself in any
, which in turn implies that in the second session both players 2 and 3 will choose 1 l with player 1 as their coalition partner according to Lemma 1-2. A type H could choose 2 l (L) and pretend to be a type L to ensure a coalitional offer in the second session on the equilibrium path and then reject the offer. The rejection implies that the game would move to the third session in equilibrium, which in turn implies that it would ensure a type H the payoff 1/3. This would give a type H a higher payoff than choosing 2 l (H). In other words, a type H would mimic a type L rather than find solutions to separate herself from a type L.
In this regime a type L has an incentive to masquerade as a type H under the "first-best" solution. Let us fix the "first-best" proposal of a type L (i.e. the best of 1h(L)), which yields the payoff that a type L can at least guarantee herself in any separating equilibrium. We check if a type H can find profitable "second-best" solutions to separate herself from a type L. There are three possibilities: (i) A type H seeks "second-best" solutions in the set of 1h(H) with 
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The above two inequalities imply
The 2 l (H) proposals that meet both δ
and (A8) do exist in this regime. Thus, separating equilibria are characterized by the feature that a type L proposes the best of 1h(L), while a type H proposes the 2 l (H) proposals that satisfy (A8) with δ
Ascribing zero weight to the mimicking type in the set of "second-best" separating equilibria allows the mimicked type to choose the separating equilibrium she prefers most. This leads to the "least-cost" separating equilibrium in which a type L proposes the best of 1h(L), while a type H makes a proposal merely satisfying the first equality part of (A8), that is, consist of the best of 1h(L) and "second-best" deviations from the best of 2 l (H).
The "least-cost" separating equilibrium is characterized by the best of 1h(L) and the least "second-best" deviation from the best of 2 l (H) that enables a type H to separate from a type L, that is, (A8-1).
Step 3. Off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs
We now specify players' off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs that support the derived separating equilibria.
(I) "No-envy" separating equilibria
There are many such beliefs. Let us consider the following:
, and 0 1 = p otherwise;
Then the posteriors in the second session will be
, the best choice for a type L is the best of 1h(L) and a type H would rather choose the best of 2 l (H) than deviate to masquerade as a type L.
, the best choice for a type H is the best of 2 l (H) and a type L would rather choose the best of 1h(L) than deviate to masquerade as a type H. Thus, neither type would like to deviate from the "no-envy" separating equilibrium under the above off-the-equilibrium-path belief.
(II) "Least-cost" separating equilibria Consider the following off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs: 
if she is a type L. Thus, player 1 if she is a type H has no incentive to deviate away from the equilibrium proposal since a deviation that can make her better off will be rejected; and the type L will still choose equilibrium proposal since it is the best one among all the choices. Therefore, the least-cost separating equilibrium can be supported. Q.E.D.
Pooling equilibria
The posteriors after a rejection of 2 l (HL), 1 l (HL) and 1h(HL) are, 
The best of 2 l (HL), 1 l (HL) and 1h(HL) are, respectively
There are two sub-regimes to consider.
The mimicking player is a type H in this regime. A type H can reveal herself and guarantee to obtain the payoff 3 / 2 by proposing the best of 1h(H). Thus, to prevent a deviation to the best of 1h(H), any pooling equilibrium must give a type H at least the payoff 3 / 2 . For a type H, the best of 2 l (HL) yields the expected
, while the best of 1 l (HL) yields the expected payoff 
such that it is worse off for a type H, viz
but better off for a type L, viz
where V 1 =4/9, , and 1 v follows (A4-1) since a rejection of 2 l (L) implies
However, there exist no such proposals that satisfy both inequalities above in this regime.
The mimicking player is a type L in this regime. A type L can reveal herself and guarantee to obtain the payoff 
(ii) Deviations are from the set of 1 l (H) with
such that it is worse off for a type L, viz
but better off for a type H, viz
there exist no such proposals that satisfy both inequalities above in this regime.
(iii) Deviations are from the set of 2 l (H) with
Summary
The best of 1h(HL) survives the refinement of the intuitive criterion and is the unique pooling equilibrium if 2 / 1 ≥ δ .
Those of 1h(HL) with
survive the refinement of the intuitive criterion and are
(from a rejection of 2 l (HL)), all players will choose 1h in the second session according to Lemma 1-1. This implies that 3 / 1
Thus the best of 2 l (HL) is
(from a rejection of 1h(HL) or 1 l (HL)), player j with
will choose the 1h proposal in the second session, while player 2 with 1 2 = p if she is a type H will choose 2 l , but if she is a type L will choose 1h. This result is on the basis of Lemma 1-3. Our derivation of the best of 1h(HL) and 1 l (HL) proceeds differently according to whether player 2 is a type H or L. (ii) Player 2 is a type H
Put in words: after the rejection of 1h(HL) or 1 l (HL), each player has a 1/3 chance of becoming the proposer in the second session; once becoming the proposer, both players 1 and 3 adopt 1h with a symmetric tie-breaking, while player 2 adopts 2 l .
Note that when player 2 is the proposer, player 2 ≠ j if she is a type H will face a 1/2 probability that 2 l fails to receive a majority support; but if she is a type L, 2 l will always receive a majority support. The best of 1h(HL) and 1 l (HL) are,
There are three sub-regimes to consider.
In this regime there exists the so-called "no-envy" separating equilibrium. We show that all pooling equilibria are dominated by the 'no-envy" separating equilibrium.
Consider the best of 1h(HL). It yields player 1 the payoff
However, this payoff is less than the payoff δ ) 2 / 1 ( 6 / 5 − of proposing the best of 2 l (H) for a type H. This means that the best of 1h(HL) is dominated by the best of 2 l (H) for player 1 if she is a type H.
Consider the best of 2 l (HL). It yields player 1 the payoff
she is type L. However, this payoff is less than the payoff of proposing the best of 1h (L) for a type L. This means that the best of 2 l (HL) is dominated by the best of 1h (L) for player 1 if she is a type L.
Similarly, the best of 1 l (HL) yields player 1 the payoff 1/2 if she is type L. This is less than the payoff of proposing the best of 1h (L) for a type L, which means that 1 l (HL) is dominated by the best of 1h (L) for player 1 if she is a type L. Thus, to prevent a deviation to the best of 1h(L), any pooling equilibrium must give a type L at least the payoff δ ) 9 / 1 ( 18 / 11 + . 1 l (HL) will not be supportable as a pooling equilibrium, since the best of 1 l (HL) in this regime yields player 1 of a type L only 2 / 1 , which is less than that from the "least-cost" separating equilibrium,
+ . Likewise, the best of 1h(HL) yields player 1 the expected payoff
+ , which is less than the payoff from the "least-cost" separating equilibrium for a type H. Thus, any pooling equilibrium in the form of 1h(HL) will be broken by a type H's deviation to the "least-cost" separating equilibrium.
The best of 2 l (HL) yields player 1 the expected payoff This leads to the conclusion that the potential candidates for the pooling equilibrium are those of 2 l (HL) with
We check if these 2 l (HL) proposals survive after the refinement of the intuitive
criterion. This refinement requires us to examine if there exists a proposal ) 1 ( 1 x deviating from these 2 l (HL) such that if the deviation is regarded as from a type H would be worse off for a type L to mimic but better off for a type H to separate.
There are three possibilities: 
there exist no such proposals that satisfy both inequalities above in this regime. 
survive the refinement of the intuitive criterion.
In this regime a type L can always reveal herself and guarantee to obtain the
criterion. This refinement requires us to examine if there exists a proposal ) 1 
